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CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS AND JULIAN DAVIS MORTENSON
In this section:
• United States and France Sign Agreement to Compensate Holocaust Victims
• United States Conducts Naval Operation Within Twelve Nautical Miles of Spratly Islands
in the South China Sea, Prompting Protests from China
• United States Pursues Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives in and Around the Arctic
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
United States and France Sign Agreement to Compensate Holocaust Victims
On December 8, 2014, the United States and France signed an agreement to compensate
Holocaust victims who were deported from France during World War II.1 Between 1941 and
1944, the French railroad company Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF)
transported 76,000 individuals to Nazi concentration camps.2 The U.S.-France agreement is
expected to provide compensation to several thousand survivors of deportation and their fam-
ilies who are U.S. citizens or nationals of other countries.3
As recounted by Stuart Eizenstat, the Special Adviser for Holocaust Issues, the French gov-
ernment initially proposed “a unilateral program to mend the holes in their existing French
program for those deported during World War II and their spouses and, in certain cases, their
children.”4 France first established a compensation program in 1946; that program provides
pensions to French nationals who were victims of anti-Semitic persecution in France.5 How-
ever, because only French citizens are eligible, the program excludes Holocaust victims who are
nationals of the United States, Canada, Israel, and other countries.6 In 2000, France estab-
lished a new program to compensate individuals of all nationalities who were “minor[s] at the
time of the deportation and lost either one or both parents, who were deported and died during
the Holocaust.”7 More than one thousand U.S. nationals have received compensation through
this program.8
The U.S.-France agreement follows unsuccessful efforts to hold SNCF responsible for its
contributions to the Holocaust in U.S. courts. In Abrams v. SNCF, twelve Holocaust victims
sued SNCF and alleged that the railroad company knowingly transported civilians to Nazi
death camps.9 In November 2004, the Second Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs. The Second
Circuit held that SNCF was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) because it was an “agency or instrumentality” of France and affirmed the district court’s
holding that none of the FSIA’s exceptions to immunity applied.10 In a similar lawsuit, Freund v.
SNCF, a different group of Holocaust survivors and their heirs and beneficiaries sued SNCF
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Compensation Fund for Holo-
caust Victims Deported from France (Dec. 8, 2014), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234822.htm
[hereinafter Joint Statement on Compensation Fund]; Agreement between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the French Republic on Compensation for Certain Victims of Holocaust-
Related Deportation from France Who Are not Covered by French Programs, U.S.-Fr., Dec. 8, 2014, at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/249135.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-France Agreement].
2 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Signing Ceremony for the U.S.-France Agreement on Holocaust Depor-
tation From France (Dec. 8, 2014), at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2014/dec/234917.htm [hereinafter
Signing Ceremony]; Maı̈a de la Baume, French Railway Formally Apologizes to Holocaust Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2011, at A6.
3 Signing Ceremony, supra note 2.
4 Id.
5 Joint Statement on Compensation Fund, supra note 1.
6 Signing Ceremony, supra note 2.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français, 389 F.3d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 2004).
10 Id. at 63; see also Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français, 175 F.Supp.2d 423, 433
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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to obtain compensation for property that they alleged SNCF had confiscated prior to deport-
ing them to concentration camps.11 The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case because
the plaintiffs failed to specifically allege that SNCF maintained possession of the stolen goods,
which was required on the Court’s reading of the FSIA’s taking clause.12
During this time period, local, state, and national legislatures introduced measures relating
to Holocaust claims against SNCF. In 2011, Maryland enacted a law that required a subsidiary
of SNCF to disclose information about its collaboration with German authorities during
World War II in order to compete for a contract to operate Maryland commuter rail lines.13
In April 2014, New York City council members introduced legislation that would have pro-
hibited New York City from conducting business with companies that profited from the Holo-
caust but that had not provided reparations to victims, including the SNCF.14 At the national
level, Senator Chuck Schumer and Representative Carolyn Maloney repeatedly introduced
legislation that would have granted jurisdiction to U.S. courts to hear claims against SNCF for
its actions during World War II that caused injury or death.15
On April 9, 2014, State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki announced that the United States
and France had begun “discussions of compensation for victims of deportations by rail from France
to Nazi labor and death camps as well as for victims’ families.”16 The announcement urged state
lawmakers, including legislators inNewYorkandMaryland, to refrain frompursuing independent
restitution measures because they presented obstacles to the bilateral negotiations.17 On December
5, 2014, the United States and France announced that they had reached an agreement to compen-
sate victims of the Holocaust who were deported from France.18 SNCF did not participate in the
negotiations; according to press reports, the French foreign ministry explained that “[i]t is the
responsibility of French authorities to assume the consequences.”19
Under the agreement, France pledged to transfer to the U.S. government a lump sum pay-
ment of $60 million that the United States would distribute to eligible claimants.20 The agree-
ment provides compensation to three groups of persons: survivors of deportation, the spouses
11 Freund v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français, 391 F. App’x 939, 940 (2d Cir. 2010).
12 Id. at 940–41; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2015).
13 Katherine Shaver, O’Malley to Sign Bill Requiring Railway to Disclose WWII Past, BALTIMORE SUN, May 19,
2011, at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-05-19/news/bs-md-marc-trains-20110519_1_holocaust-victims-sncf-
trains-holocaust-survivor-groups.
14 Press Release, Benjamin J. Kallos, New York City Councilmember, Malloney, Levine, and Kallos Fight for
Holocaust Reparations for Survivors (Apr. 28, 2014), at http://www.benkallos.com/press-release/maloney-levine-
kallos-fight-holocaust-reparations-survivors.
15 S. 634, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1193, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1393, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1505,
113th Cong. (2013).
16 Press Release, Dep’t of State, Negotiations With France Concerning Compensation for Victims of Depor-
tation and Their Families by the French National Railway Company (SNCF) During the Holocaust (Apr. 9, 2014),
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/224621.htm.
17 Id. Two months earlier, Maryland state legislators introduced a bill to disqualify a firm whose majority stake-
holder is SNCF from bidding on a $4 billion contract. U.S. Lawmakers Take Aim at French Rail for Holocaust Role,
FRANCE 24, Feb. 6, 2014, at http://www.france24.com/en/20140205-usa-lawmakers-push-disqualify-french-rail-
sncf-holocaust-role.
18 Press Release, Dep’t of State, U.S.-France Agreement on Compensation for Certain Victims of Holocaust-
Related Deportation from France Who Are Not Covered by French Programs (Dec. 5, 2014), at http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234709.htm.
19 France to Pay $60m into Compensation Fund for U.S. Victims of Holocaust, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 3, 2015,
at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/03/france-60m-compensates-fund-us-holocaust-victims.
20 U.S.-France Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
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of survivors, and the heirs of survivors or their spouses.21 Claimants are not eligible if they are
French citizens or if they are citizens of a nation that has concluded a bilateral compensation
agreement with France—Belgium, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the former Czechoslo-
vakia.22 Nor are claimants eligible if they qualify for a separate French compensation program
for individuals whose parents died because of deportation or if they have received compensa-
tion from another state for Holocaust deportation.23 Notably, unlike traditional claim reso-
lution agreements, the U.S.-France agreement does not limit compensation to eligible U.S. cit-
izens. Unless they are excluded pursuant to the provisions above, non-U.S. nationals are
eligible for compensation under the program.24
The agreement provides:
Upon payment of the [$60 million sum], the Government of the United States of America:
1. . . . [C]onfirms its recognition in connection with any Holocaust deportation claims of:
(i) the sovereign immunity of France and the property of France; and
(ii) the diplomatic, consular, or official immunity of French officials, employees, and
agents and the property of each,
as such sovereign, diplomatic, consular, and official immunities are normally recognized
within the United States legal system for other foreign states, their agencies, instrumen-
talities, officials, employees, and agents, and the property of each.
2. Shall secure, with the assistance of the Government of the French Republic if need be,
at the earliest possible date, the termination of any pending suits or future suits that may
be filed in any court at any level of the United States legal system against France concerning
any Holocaust deportation claim.
3. Shall, in a timely manner, and consistent with its constitutional structure, undertake all
actions necessary to achieve the objectives of this Agreement, which include an enduring
legal peace, at the federal, state, and local levels of government in the United States of
America and shall avoid any action that:
a. Contradicts the terms of the Agreement, and in particular challenges the sovereign
immunity of France concerning any Holocaust deportation claim; or
b. Stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the Agreement.
4. Shall require, before making any distribution payment to an eligible recipient under this
Agreement, that the recipient execute a writing following the form of the Annex attached
to this Agreement, including (i) a waiver of all the recipient’s rights to assert claims for com-
pensatory or other relief in any forum against France concerning the Holocaust deporta-
tion or pension programs related thereto; (ii) a declaration that the recipient has not
received, and will not claim, any payment under French programs or an international
agreement concluded by the Government of the French Republic relating to Holocaust
21 Id. Art. 2(1).
22 Id. Art. 3(1–2); Press Release, Dep’t of State, Joint Statement Between the United States and France Regarding
the Entry into Force of a Bilateral Agreement on the Establishment of Compensation Fund for Holocaust Victims
Deported From France (Nov. 3, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/11/249122.htm [hereinafter
Joint Statement on U.S.-France Agreement].
23 U.S.-France Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 3(3–4).
24 Joint Statement on U.S.-France Agreement, supra note 22.
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deportation; and (iii) a declaration that the recipient has not received any payment under
any other State’s compensation program or under the compensation program of any for-
eign institution relating specifically to Holocaust deportation.25
The annex to the agreement contains a form that each claimant must sign prior to receiving
compensation. The form provides that claimants agree to “release and forever discharge France
and any French national (including natural and juridical persons) from any liability of any kind
for all claims relating to Holocaust deportation.”26 The form additionally requires recipients
to waive any claims against the United States related to Holocaust deportation.27 The agree-
ment does not waive the rights of individuals who do not participate in the compensation pro-
gram, although it does confirm that, with respect to deportation claims, France is entitled to
the same immunities that the U.S. legal system recognizes for other states; the agreement also
requires the United States to secure the termination of any lawsuits against France concerning
deportation claims.
The agreement entered into force on November 1, 2015.28 Its entry into force followed
approval by the French Parliament.29 On the United States side, the agreement is a sole exec-
utive agreement. In a joint statement, the United States and France described the agreement
as “another measure of justice to help those who suffered the harms of one of history’s darkest
eras, and another example of the close U.S.-France partnership that characterizes our relation-
ship.”30 The U.S. Department of State began accepting applications from claimants on
November 2, 2015.31
INTERNATIONAL OCEANS, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND AVIATION LAW
United States Conducts Naval Operation Within Twelve Nautical Miles of Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea, Prompting Protests from China
On October 26, 2015, the guided missile destroyer USS Lassen undertook a “freedom of
navigation” operation in the South China Sea, an area that has been beset by conflicting ter-
ritorial and maritime claims.1 The operation comes amidst growing tensions between the
United States and China about China’s activities in the South China Sea. China has asserted
maritime claims to certain islands and waters in the South China Sea since the 1950s, but in
the view of the U.S., those claims appear inconsistent with the international law of the sea.2
25 U.S.-France Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 5.
26 Id. Annex.
27 Id.
28 Joint Statement on U.S.-France Agreement, supra note 22.
29 Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, U.S. Congresswoman, Maloney Applauds French Parliament
Approval of Historic Compensation for Holocaust Victims Deported on SNCF Trains ( July 9, 2015), at
https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/maloney-applauds-french-parliament-approval-of-
historic-compensation-for.
30 Joint Statement on U.S.-France Agreement, supra note 22.
31 Commencement of Holocaust Deportation Claims Program Under U.S.-France Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/deportationclaims/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
1 See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 667
(2015); 108 AJIL 529 (2014); 108 AJIL 331 (2014).
2 See generally OFFICE OF OCEAN & POLAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS: NO. 143,
CHINA: MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (2014).
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More recently, China began undertaking massive land reclamation projects in the Spratly
Islands.3 The United States has consistently opposed these actions, citing concerns about
regional destabilization and potential militarization of the artificial features.4 China, in turn,
has blamed the United States for “pushing the militarization” by conducting military exercises
in the South China Sea.5
Accompanied by two maritime surveillance aircraft, the Lassen came within twelve nautical
miles of Subi Reef, one of the artificial features that China has built among the Spratly Islands.6
In response to the Lassen’s entry within the twelve-mile zone, a Chinese naval missile destroyer
and patrol vessel followed the ship and sent warnings.7 A U.S. defense official later testified that
the operation—the first of its kind to be conducted within twelve nautical miles of any of the
Chinese-built features since 20128—was completed “without incident.”9
Chinese officials immediately criticized the maneuver. Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Lu Kang described the Lassen’s passage near the reef as “illegal[ ]” and further
asserted that the operation “threatened China’s sovereignty and security interests, put the
personnel and facilities on the islands and reefs at risk and endangered regional peace and
stability.”10 Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui echoed Lu’s statements regarding the
operation’s illegality and “expresse[d] [China’s] strong dissatisfaction and opposition” to
the “serious provocation.”11
Following the operation, Zhang summoned the U.S. Ambassador to China to discuss the
incident,12 and senior Chinese officials met with their U.S. counterparts to urge the United
3 See generally Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109
AJIL 667 (2015).
4 See id.; see also The President’s News Conference with President Xi Jinping of China, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 647 (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter News Conference].
5 Javier C. Hernández, China Blames U.S. Military Actions for Tensions in the South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES, July
30, 2015, at A9.
6 Helene Cooper, Challenging Chinese Claims, U.S. Sends Warship Near Artificial Island Chain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2015, at A7; Michael J. Green, Bonnie S. Glaser & Gregory B. Poling, The U.S. Asserts Freedom of Navigation
in the South China Sea, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Oct. 27, 2015), at http://csis.org/publication/
us-asserts-freedom-navigation-south-china-sea.
7 Press Release, China Ministry of Nat’l Def., Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on (Oct. 29,
2015), at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-10/29/content_4626549.htm [hereinafter Oct. 29 Press Confer-
ence].
8 Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong.
22 (Sept. 17, 2015) (statement of Assistant Sec’y of Defense for Asian & Pac. Sec. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Defense,
Ambassador David B. Shear).
9 Simon Denyer, China Says U.S. Naval Destroyer Sailing Close to Chinese-Built Island Damages Peace and Sta-
bility, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-says-us-naval-destroyer-
sailing-close-to-chinese-built-island-damages-peace-and-stability/2015/10/27/25b254b4-7c7a-11e5-beba-
927fd8634498_story.html.
10 Press Release, China Ministry of Foreign Aff., Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on USS
Lassen’s Entry into Waters near Relevant Islands and Reefs of China’s Nansha Islands (Oct. 27, 2015), at http://
www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1309567.shtml [hereinafter Lu Remarks].
11 Press Release, China Ministry of Foreign Aff., Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui Makes Stern Represen-
tations to US over US Naval Vessel’s Entry into Waters near Relevant Islands and Reefs of China’s Nansha Islands
(Oct. 27, 2015), at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1310069.shtml [hereinafter Zhang Representa-
tions].
12 Id.
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States to prevent “similar incident[s] from happening again.”13 Both Zhang and Lu stated that
China would “take all necessary measures” to respond appropriately to this action and any
other “deliberate provocation[s].”14 In addition, the commander of the Chinese Navy, Admi-
ral Wu Shengli, asserted during a conversation with U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
John Richardson that such “dangerous, provocative acts” could lead to “a seriously pressing
situation between frontline forces from both sides on the sea and in the air, or even a minor
incident that sparks war.”15
Administration officials initially made few statements regarding the operation. White
House and State Department officials declined to comment on initial reports,16 instead direct-
ing media to address questions to the Department of Defense.17 Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter confirmed that media reports of the operation were accurate, but would not “say more
than that.”18 White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz stated only that “the
operation . . . was the result of a rigorous interagency process designed to produce options for
[U.S.] leadership to ensure” protection of “the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and
airspace guaranteed to all nations under international law.”19 This limited response was the
result, administration officials said, of White House instructions to refrain from more specific
public comment.20
The Lassen operation’s significance for the U.S. position on China’s South China Sea
claims was not immediately clear. Carter stated that the Lassen “conducted a freedom of
navigation operation, in accordance with international law.”21 Such operations can serve
13 Oct. 29 Press Conference, supra note 7 (noting meetings between U.S. officials and officers of the Foreign
Affairs Office of China’s Ministry of National Defense and Chinese Defense Attaché in Washington, D.C.).
14 Zhang Representations, supra note 11; Lu Remarks, supra note 10.
15 Ben Blanchard & Andrea Shalal, China Naval Chief Says Minor Incident Could Spark War in South China Sea,
REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2015), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/30/us-southchinasea-usa-china-
navy-idUSKCN0SO05320151030#YaqXzvMHxkeCQxYJ.97.
16 See White House Daily Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 26, 2015), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/daily-press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-102615 [hereinaf-
ter Earnest Briefing]; U.S. Dep’t of State Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 26, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
dpb/2015/10/248743.htm; U.S. Dep’t of State Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 27, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/




17 See Earnest Briefing, supra note 16; Oct. 27 State Department Briefing, supra note 16.
18 United States Military Strategy in the Middle East: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong.
116 (Oct. 27, 2015), at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-81%20-%2010-27-15.pdf.
19 Press Briefing, The White House, Press Gaggle Aboard Air Force One en route Andrews AFB, 10/28/15 (Oct.
28, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/28/press-gaggle-aboard-air-force-one-en-
route-andrews-afb-102815.
20 See Helene Cooper & Jane Perlez, White House Moves to Reassure Allies with South China Sea Patrol, but Quietly,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2015, at A7.
21 Ash Carter, Sec’y of Defense, Remarks on “Strategic and Operational Innovation at a Time of Transition and
Turbulence” at the Reagan National Defense Forum (Nov. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Carter Remarks] available
at http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/628146/remarks-on-strategic-and-
operational-innovation-at-a-time-of-transition-and-tur; see also Adm. Harry B. Harris, Jr., Commander, U.S.
Pac. Command, Speech at Stanford Center – Peking University, Beijing China (Nov. 3, 2015) (noting the
“routine” nature of U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea) [hereinafter Harris, Jr.
Speech] available at http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/627100/
admiral-harris-speech-at-stanford-center-peking-university-beijing-china.aspx.
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as one means of challenging maritime claims with which the United States disagrees.22
According to a press report, on the other hand, an unnamed U.S. navy source indicated
that “the warship took steps to indicate it was making a lawful innocent passage with no
warlike intent. The ship’s fire control radars were turned off and it flew no helicopters.”23
This alternate framing of the operation was potentially significant, since the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea permits vessels to transit in “innocent passage” through the ter-
ritorial seas of other states.24 As a result, some commentators suggested that by proceeding
in innocent passage the United States implicitly recognized China’s claim to a territorial
sea around its artificial island on Subi Reef.25
At least partially in response to uncertainty about the precise characterization on the Lassen
operation, Pentagon Spokesman Captain Jeff Davis denied that the patrol had been conducted
as an innocent passage,26 and another U.S. official suggested the operational restrictions on the
Lassen’s “freedom of navigation” operation had been adopted for policy reasons, so as not to
“inflame the situation” with China.27
In light of these conflicting remarks, Senator John McCain wrote to Carter requesting that
the Department of Defense “publicly clarify . . . the legal intent behind th[e] operation and any
future operations of a similar nature.”28 In response, Carter reiterated that the Lassen had con-
ducted a “freedom of navigation” operation (FONOP).29 He further stated:
[T]he operation did not challenge any country’s claims of sovereignty over land features,
as that is not the purpose or function of a FONOP. Rather, this FONOP challenged
attempts by claimants to restrict navigation rights and freedoms around features they
claim, including policies by some claimants requiring prior permission or notification of
transits within territorial seas. . . .30
The FONOP involved a continuous and expeditious transit that is consistent with both the
right of innocent passage, which only applies in a territorial sea, and with the high seas free-
dom of navigation that applies beyond any territorial sea. With respect to Subi Reef, the
22 Green et al., supra note 6.
23 Christopher P. Cavas, Navy Chiefs Talk, New Details on Destroyer’s Passage, DEFENSE NEWS (Oct. 31, 2015,
10:58 AM), at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/10/31/navy-china-richardson-wu-destroyer-las-
sen-south-china-sea-innocent-passage/74881704/.
24 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 17, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
25 Julian Ku, The US Navy’s “Innocent Passage” in the South China Sea May Have Actually Strengthened China’s
Sketchy Territorial Claims, LAWFARE (Nov. 4, 2015, 11:10 AM), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-navys-inno-
cent-passage-south-china-sea-may-have-actually-strengthened-chinas-sketchy-territorial.
26 Andrea Shalal & David Brunnstrom, U.S. Patrol Sought to Avoid Provocation, Not Reinforce China Island
Claim: Officials, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2015), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/07/us-southchinasea-
usa-passage-idUSKCN0SV2QK20151107#PBU1bvBhjvtEJmc1.97.
27 Id.
28 Letter from Senator John McCain, Chairman, S. Comm. Armed Servs., to Ashton B. Carter, U.S. Sec’y of
Defense (Nov. 9, 2015), available at http://news.usni.org/2015/11/10/document-letter-from-sen-john-mccain-
to-secdef-carter-on-u-s-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operation.
29 Letter from Ash Carter, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, to John McCain, Chairman, S. Comm. Armed Servs., at 1 (Dec.
21, 2015), available at http://news.usni.org/2016/01/05/document-secdef-carter-letter-to-mccain-on-south-
china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operation [hereinafter Carter Letter].
30 [Editors’ note: The United States has contested requirements imposed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam
requiring notification and/or prior consent in the South China Sea. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE FOR
OCEAN POLICY AFFAIRS, MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL (2014), at http://www.jag.navy.mil/
organization/code_10_mcrm.htm (describing requirements for notice and/or prior permission for transit by for-
eign vessels through territorial waters claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam).]
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claimants have not clarified whether they believe a territorial sea surrounds it, but one thing
is clear: under the law of the sea, China’s land reclamation cannot create a legal entitlement
to a territorial sea, and does not change our legal ability to navigate near it in this manner.
We believe that Subi Reef, before China turned it into an artificial island, was a low-tide
elevation and that it therefore cannot generate its own entitlement to a territorial sea. How-
ever, if it is located within 12 nautical miles of another geographic feature that is entitled
to a territorial sea—as might be the case with Sandy Cay—then the low-water line on Subi
Reef could be used as the baseline for measuring Sandy Cay’s territorial sea. In other words,
in those circumstances, Subi Reef could be surrounded by a 12-nautical mile-territorial sea
despite being submerged at high tide in its natural state. Given the factual uncertainty, we
conducted the FONOP in a manner that is lawful under all possible scenarios to preserve
U.S. options should the factual ambiguities be resolved, disputes settled, and clarity on
maritime claims reached.31
At the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers-Plus
Meeting, Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wangquan told Carter that there is a “bottom
line” to China’s patience with the ongoing challenges to China’s territorial claims.32 U.S.
officials have nonetheless said that freedom of navigation operations will continue in the
South China Sea. Discussing such operations, Carter stated: “We’ve done them before, all
over the world. And we will do them again. We meant what we say. We will continue to
fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.”33 Another U.S. defense official
said that the U.S. Navy plans to conduct patrols within twelve nautical miles of artificial
features in the South China Sea about twice per quarter, a frequency intended to dem-
onstrate the United States’ determination “to regularly exercise [its] rights under inter-
national law.”34 Indeed, the United States conducted a similar aerial operation recently,
flying two B-52 strategic bombers near artificial features in the Spratly Islands.35 Although
the planes were contacted by Chinese ground controllers and continued their mission,36
it is unclear whether the bombers passed within twelve nautical miles of any of the Chi-
nese-built features.37
31 Carter Letter, supra note 29, at 1–2.
32 See Yeganeh Torbati & Trinna Leong, U.S., Japan Push for Inclusion of South China Sea in Defense Forum
Statement, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2015), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/03/us-asean-malaysia-
idUSKCN0SS07F20151103#S0u5viBWJMstOCEI.97.
33 Carter Remarks, supra note 21; see also Harris, Jr. Speech, supra note 21 (“[O]ur military will continue to fly,
sail, and operate whenever and wherever international law allows. The South China Sea is not—and will not—be
an exception.”).
34 Andrea Shalal & Idrees Ali, U.S. Navy Plans Two or More Patrols in South China Sea per Quarter,
REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2015), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/03/us-southchinasea-usa-navy-
idUSKCN0SR28W20151103#Hwdw1e12xkvGC5Du.97.
35 Yeganeh Torbati & David Alexander, U.S. Bombers Flew Near China-Built Islands in South China Sea: Pen-
tagon, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2015, 5:51 AM), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/13/us-southchinasea-usa-
idUSKCN0T12G720151113#rBoQJ89CT8kQ8MlM.97.
36 Press Briefing, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing
Room, (Nov. 12, 2015), at http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/628778/
department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-in.
37 Compare Torbati & Alexander, supra note 35 (citing statement by Pentagon spokesman Commander Bill
Urban that the bombers did not fly within twelve nautical miles), with Kristina Wong, US Flies B-52 Bombers near
Disputed Islands Claimed by China, HILL (Nov. 12, 2015, 2:17 PM), at http://thehill.com/policy/defense/259958-
us-flies-b-52-bombers-near-islands-claimed-by-china (noting a statement by a U.S. official that bombers made one
pass within twelve nautical miles of islands).
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United States Pursues Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives in and Around the Arctic
Climate change is bringing about significant changes to the Arctic region, where the United
States faces economic, environmental, and military opportunities and challenges.1 Since the
United States assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in April 2015, policymakers
have focused more attention on the region.2 In August, President Barack Obama became the
first sitting president to visit the U.S. Arctic.3
During his visit, Obama addressed the Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic:
Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience (GLACIER).4 Participants at the
conference included representatives of Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European
Union.5 At GLACIER’s conclusion, most of the participants signed a joint statement
acknowledging the impact of climate change in the Arctic and reiterating their commit-
ment to combat climate change.6
Two significant developments in and around the Arctic concern international regulation of
fishing. In July, the five states with land territory in the Arctic Circle—Canada, Denmark, Nor-
way, Russia, and the United States—met in Oslo and adopted a nonbinding declaration setting
out political commitments to restrict commercial fishing on the Arctic high seas until a sus-
tainable management plan is in place.7 This portion of the Arctic Ocean includes the North
Pole and is larger than Alaska and Texas combined.8 Although it is largely covered by icepack,
the summer sea ice shrank to a record low in 2012, briefly turning about 40 percent of the area
1 See, e.g., Thom Shanker, Pentagon Releases Strategy for the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, at A7; Steven
Lee Meyers, U.S. Is Playing Catch-Up With Russia in Scramble for the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2015, at A1.
2 John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks on Intervention at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting (Apr.
24, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/04/241098.htm. The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder,
ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (“The Arctic
Council is the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the
Arctic states.”). See generally Brian R. Israel, Review Essay: International Law and Governance in a Changing Arctic,
108 AJIL 348 (2014).
3 President Obama’s Trip to Alaska, THE WHITE HOUSE, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/2015-alaska-trip (last
visited Jan. 25, 2015). See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces New Invest-
ments to Enhance Safety and Security in the Changing Arctic (Sept. 1, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/09/01/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new-investments-enhance-safety-and.
4 Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the GLACIER Conference—Anchorage, AK
(Aug. 31, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/01/remarks-president-glacier-confer-
ence-anchorage-ak.
5 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, John Kirby, Spokesperson, Secretary Kerry Travel to Anchorage, AK (Aug.
25, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/246327.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Con-
ference on Global Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience (GLACIER) ( July
23, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245241.htm.
6 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Statement on Climate Change and the Arctic (Aug. 31, 2015), at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/246487.htm.
7 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Arctic Nations Sign Declaration to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the Cen-
tral Arctic Ocean ( July 16, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244969.htm [hereinafter Arctic
Nations Sign Declaration]; Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the
Central Arctic Ocean, July 16, 2015, at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/
folkerett/declaration-on-arctic-fisheries-16-july-2015.pdf, [hereinafter Oslo Declaration].
8 Steven Lee Myers, Sea Warming Leads to Ban on Fishing in the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2015, at A6.
2016] 125CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Thu, 28 Jul 2016 14:23:53 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
into open water.9 According to press reports, tensions over Ukraine delayed the declaration for
over a year.10 An excerpt of the declaration follows:
We recognize that until recently ice has generally covered the high seas portion of the cen-
tral Arctic Ocean on a year-round basis, which has made fishing in those waters impossible
to conduct. We acknowledge that, due to climate change resulting in changes in ice dis-
tribution and related environmental phenomena, the marine ecosystems of the Arctic
Ocean are evolving and that the effects of these changes are poorly understood. We note
that the Arctic ecosystems until now have been relatively unexposed to human activi-
ties. . . .
We are aware that fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean may occur both within areas under the
fisheries jurisdiction of the coastal States and in the high seas portion of the central Arctic
Ocean, including straddling fish stocks. We note further that the ice cover in the Arctic
Ocean has been diminishing in recent years, including over some of the high seas portion
of the central Arctic Ocean.
We recognize that, based on available scientific information, commercial fishing in the
high seas of the central Arctic Ocean is unlikely to occur in the near future and, therefore,
there is no need at present to establish any additional regional fisheries management orga-
nization for this area. Nevertheless, recalling the obligations of States under international
law to cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living marine
resources in high seas areas, including the obligation to apply the precautionary approach,
we share the view that it is desirable to implement appropriate interim measures to deter
unregulated fishing in the future in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean.
. . . .
We therefore intend to implement, in the single high seas portion of the central Arctic
Ocean that is entirely surrounded by waters under the fisheries jurisdictions of Canada, the
Kingdom of Denmark in respect of Greenland, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Fed-
eration and the United States of America, the following measures:
 We will authorize our vessels to conduct commercial fishing in this high seas area
only pursuant to one or more regional or subregional fisheries management orga-
nizations or arrangements that are or may be established to manage such fishing in
accordance with recognized international standards.
 We will establish a joint program of scientific research with the aim of improving
understanding of the ecosystems of this area and promote cooperation with relevant
scientific bodies . . . .
 We will promote compliance with these interim measures and with relevant inter-
national law, including by coordinating our monitoring, control and surveillance
activities in this area.
 We will ensure that any non-commercial fishing in this area does not undermine the
purpose of the interim measures, is based on scientific advice and is monitored, and
that data obtained through any such fishing is shared.11
9 Alister Doyle, Russia, U.S. Agree Fishing Ban in Arctic as Sea Ice Melts, REUTERS ( July 16, 2015), at http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-idUSKCN0PQ15N20150716.
10 Id.; see also Myers, supra note 8.
11 Oslo Declaration, supra note 7.
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According to the State Department, the declaration
builds on U.S. action in 2009 to prohibit commercial fishing in its Exclusive Economic
Zone north of the Bering Strait until better scientific information to support sound fish-
eries management is available. The United States initiated this five-state process consistent
with congressional direction under Public Law 110-243, which calls for the United States
to take steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement for managing fish stocks
in the Arctic Ocean, as well as the Implementation Plan for the 2013 National Strategy
for the Arctic Region, which commits the United States to prevent unregulated high seas
fishing in the Arctic.12
In December, the United States hosted a meeting attended by delegations from the five states
that adopted the Oslo Declaration, as well as China, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, and
Korea, which addressed their common goal of preventing unregulated commercial fishing in
the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean.13 The United States presented a proposal for an
international agreement there.14 Although the proposal was not negotiated at the meeting, par-
ticipating states agreed to follow-up meetings to be held in the coming year.15
Separately, on September 11, 2015, the United States and Russia entered into a bilateral
treaty “to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated [IUU] fishing.”16 Alaskan crab fishers
in the Bering Sea, which lies just south of the Arctic, strongly supported the agreement (which
is not geographically limited).17 According to one estimate, illegally harvested Russian crab has
cost Alaska Bering Sea fishermen up to $560 million.18 The World Wildlife Fund had pre-
viously issued a research report highlighting the significance of the problem: “Official customs
data from South Korea, Japan, China and the United States indicate that in 2013, these four
countries (which account for nearly all of Russia’s official crab exports) imported 1.69 times
as much live and frozen crab from Russia as official Russian harvest levels. Over the past decade,
the level of overharvest due to illegal crab harvesting was two to four times the legal limit, caus-
ing grave concern about the sustainability of several Russian Far East crab species.”19
12 Arctic Nations Sign Declaration, supra note 7. [Editors’ Note: Public Law No. 110-243, 122 Stat. 1569, June
3, 2008, provides, in part: “Now, therefore, be it [r]esolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, [t]hat (1) the United States should initiate international discus-
sions and take necessary steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement or agreements for managing
migratory, transboundary, and straddling fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean and establishing a new international fish-
eries management organization or organizations for the region.” The 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region
is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.]
13 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: Chairman’s
Statement (Dec. 3, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/pr/250352.htm.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States and Russia Sign Agreement to Prevent Illegal Fishing (Sept.
11, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/246833.htm [hereinafter U.S. and Russia Sign IUU
Agreement]; Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Rus-
sian Federation on Cooperation for the Purposes of Preventing, Deterring and Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing, U.S.-Russ., Sept. 11, 2015 (entered into force Dec. 4, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/250927.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Russia IUU Fishing Agreement].




19 WORLD WILDLIFE FEDERATION, ILLEGAL RUSSIAN CRAB: AN INVESTIGATION OF TRADE FLOW 1
(2014).
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The U.S. State Department explained that “[t]he agreement aims to improve coordination
among the multiple government agencies in both countries that need to work together to
address IUU fishing.”20 According to press reports, in the past, the U.S. Coast Guard and its
Russian equivalent “could not share data due to a touchy international relationship” and
“[a]cquiring Russian information at all was problematic.”21 The treaty provides, in part, that
“[i]n order to achieve the purposes of this Agreement, the Parties’ competent authorities shall”:
1. Cooperate in preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU fishing22 and fishing-re-
lated activities, including the import into the territory of one Party’s state of fish
that were harvested as a result of IUU fishing within waters under the jurisdiction
of the other Party.
2. Cooperate in identifying suspect vessels and exchanging information about them,
including through the compilation of a list of suspect vessels. . . .
3. Exchange information concerning:
(a) on the fifth day of every month:
i) the aggregate quantity and types of imported fish that originated from
the other Party’s state;
ii) vessels of the Parties, as well as suspect vessels, that have unloaded fish
that originated in one Party’s state in ports of the other Party’s
state . . . . ;
iii) vessels of the Parties, as well as suspect vessels, that were denied entry into
a port of either Party because it was established that they have engaged
in or they are suspected of having engaged in IUU fishing or in fishing-
related activities in support of IUU fishing . . . .;
iv) violations by individuals and/or legal entities of one Party of the legis-
lation of the other Party concerning fishing or fishing-related activities;
(b) within 10 days of the time of completion of inspections:
i) the results of any inspection of fishing-related activities that is conducted
by the competent authorities of one Party in its port on a vessel under the
other Party’s flag or whose owner is an individual or legal entity of the
other Party; and
ii) the results of any inspection of fishing-related activities that is conducted
by the competent authorities of one Party in its port on suspect vessels
that delivered fish that originated in the other Party’s state;
20 U.S. and Russia Sign IUU Agreement, supra note 16.
21 Summers, supra note 17.
22 [Editors’ note: Article 1(1)(a) defines “illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing” as “the activities set out
in paragraph 3 of the 2001 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing.” That document is available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm.]
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(c) within the shortest possible time, with respect to the Parties’ vessels, as
well as suspect vessels, that are requesting entry to a port of either Party
to unload fish, to include information about each vessel, the names of the
ports to which such vessels are requesting entry, the dates of receipt of
such requests and, if available, information about the origin of the fish
aboard such vessels;
. . . .
4. Within the framework of their legislation and international agreements to which
both Parties are party, cooperate to the fullest extent possible in the investigation
and adjudication of cases related to IUU fishing and fishing-related activities in sup-
port of IUU fishing.
5. Take necessary measures, in accordance with the Parties’ legislation, with respect
to fish that originate in one Party’s state and that have been unloaded or are to be
unloaded in a port of the other Party’s state in cases where there is evidence that such
fish were harvested as a result of IUU fishing or fishing-related activities in support
of IUU fishing provided by the Party where the fish originated.
6. Participate in working consultations and other types of joint activities conducted
by the Parties’ competent authorities.23
The treaty entered into force on December 4, 2015. Given the reportedly mixed results
achieved by prior bilateral treaties on IUU fishing that Russia entered into with Japan and
South Korea,24 it remains to be seen how effectively this agreement will restrain IUU fishing.
23 U.S.-Russia IUU Fishing Agreement, supra note 16.
24 Summers, supra note 17.
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